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KANT'S VIEWS

There has been a considerable renaissance in retributivism as a theory
of the justification of punishment in the second half of this century.
Retributivism is often defended as if it were a particularly hardy moral
intuition, a basic free-standing moral principle that is underivable
from any broader theory or set of principles. In this vein it is often
"supported" through the presentation of outrageous and horribly cruel
crimes, especially against persons, particularly murder, in order to elicit
what may be thought to be the natural and appropriate emotional
response, a response of anger, indignation, and desire for retribution. 2
Under such accounts the retributive idea has little to do with ethics
thought of as a rationally defended systematic theory.3
In the history of retributivism, Kant has a prominent place. He was
one of the classic defenders of a tough retributivism, at a time when the
new humaneness and teleology in the theory of punishment was
making its first headway with the help of (equally classic) Enlightenment writers like Beccaria. I wish to show that Kant did not regard
retribution as a basic, underivable moral principle; rather, he is
concerned, as far as possible, to find a rational basis for the idea of
retribution, and to relate it closely to the root ideas of his moral
1119
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philosophy: the categorical imperative (CI), and the idea of respect for
persons. Kant's theory of punishment has been discussed usually as a
series of statements that have been considered for their implications for
the justification of punishment; it is less often considered with respect
to its basis in the broader Kantian practical philosophy.
Kant uses the phrase"a categorical imperative" usually to refer to a
specific obligation that is derived from the categorical imperative. Thus
for example, "Refrain from making any lying promises" is a categorical
imperative that is established by the argument presented in the second
of Kant's well-known four examples in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik
der Sitten. 4 So when Kant writes that "The principle of punishment is a
categorical imperative" (MS, 6:331), he is telling us that this principle
(a) makes an unconditional moral demand, not one that may be altered
for the sake of someone's convenience or preference, and (b) that it can
be derived from some version of the categorical imperative. The title
quotation also refers to the principle of punishment, which Kant
identifies as the lex talionis (MS, 6:232). The lex talionis is usually
identified with the formulations derived from Mosaic law, "An eye for
an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life for a life."s
Punishment is in Kant's view a topic in the philosophy of law or
right (Recht). Punishment is imposed not by individuals, but by courts
and judges, and it is therefore a practice that presupposes the existence
of the state. Kant argues in some detail that we have a moral obligation
to leave the state of nature and to enter a civil commonwealth, because
it is only in a state or commonwealth that external justice, especially
with respect to rights to hold property, can be assured and enforced.
The state then exists as the enforcer of the rights of citizens. 6
Kant's theory of the state and its proper functions, and of the law of
property and of punishment, are all statements of moral ideals. Kant
understands that actual states will at best approximate to such ideals,
and at worst, will fail to exemplify some or all of these ideals? We
should remember that in the discussions that follow Kant is talking
about developing an ideal, and we can think about the issue of
punishment in a similar vein by asking to what extent Kant's ideal is
embodied or not in arrangements for handling crime and punishment
in present-day societies. 8
Because the discussion of punishment is part of the Rechtslehre,
what we are applying is not the familiar categorical imperative as
stated in the Grundlegung: "Act only on that maxim through which
you can at the same time will that it should be a universal law" (G,
4:421). Rather we will be using the more restricted version that is
appropriate for Recht, which Kant calls "The Universal Principle of
Law (Recht)":
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"An action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in
accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of
choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with
a universal law." (MS, 6:230; the quotation marks are in Kant's text)

The kind of freedom referred to is external freedom. Inner freedom of
thought and motivation is beyond the reach of Recht. Also, with respect
to inner freedom, individuals could not corne into conflict. The concern
of the principle of right is the ways in which one individual's use of
freedom may interfere wIth that of another individual.9
It will be noticed that the quoted principle contains the phrase,
familiar from the CI, "universal law." This is the main part of the
principle that establishes the connection with the original CI. The
universal principle of law is a more specific version of the general CI, a
version limited to external actions that might affect others. The
restatement of the law in terms of coexistence of everyone's freedom is
a paraphrase of the "universal law" idea. My breaking a promise will
be right only if my freedom to break the promise can coexist with a
similar freedom on the part of everyone else to break such promises.
Since in Kant's view, such freedoms of each and every person to fail to
keep promises cannot coexist, then such an action cannot be right, that
is, in accord with the universal principle of right. The universal law
formulations of the CI are principles of justice or fairness, and in that
sense they are also principles of equality. Kant immediately presents an
argument to show that "there is connected with Right by the principle
of contradiction an authorization to coerce someone who infringes
upon it" (MS, 6:231). A little later he concludes, "Right and authorization to use coercion mean one and the same thing" (MS, 6:232). This
authorization amounts to an authorization to punish individuals guilty
of actions that violate the law, for punishment turns out to be the only
kind of coercion that Kant discusses. lO
The motivation within the doctrine of "Recht" is not the inner
motive of duty that Kant has emphasized so much in the Grundlegung
and the second Critique. But since Kant insists that a moral precept
must always be paired with a motivation adequate to make it effective
in human choice (see MS, 6:218-19), we here introduce the threat of
coercion and punishment to take the place of inner moral motivation,
which we are not relying on in Recht (MS, 6:232). The laws against rape
or against speeding on the interstate do not appeal to our better nature
in asking us to refrain; they warn us that if we violate (and are caught
and convicted) we will be punished, and the fear of punishment
provides the incentive. Hence, according to Kant's way of proceeding
here, in the realm of Recht, the concern with action is limited to the
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external, that which can affect another, and hence that which can bring
us into conflict with the wishes and indeed with the rights of another. 11
When Kant begins his main discussion of punishment (MS,
6:331£f.), he juxtaposes two ideas, that of equality and that of the law of
retribution (lex talionis), as follows (I quote at length):
But what kind and what amount of punishment is it that public justice
makes its principle and measure? None other than the principle of
equality (in the position of the needle on the scale of justice), to
include no more to one side than to the other. Accordingly, whatever
undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the people, that you
inflict upon yourself.... But only the law of retribution (lex talionis)-it
being understood, of course, that this is applied by a court (not by
your private judgment)--ean specify definitely the quality and the
quantity of punishment; all other principles are fluctuating and
unsuited for a sentence of pure and strict justice because extraneous
considerations are mixed into them. (MS, 6:332)

The proper measure of the punishment, namely, equality, restores the
equilibrium that existed before the crime, and that was first disturbed
by the crime.
The fact that he understands the criterion for punishment in this
quote in terms of the idea of equality means that Kant intends the
criterion as an application of the categorical imperative. In supplementary comments added in the second edition, he writes, in a similar
vein, that only the lex talionis "is by its form always the principle of the
right to punish since it alone is the principle determining this Idea a
priori." (The CI is itself a priori.) The phrases used to spell out the CI,
"universal law," "coexistence," and so on all imply equality; the idea of
equality is perhaps most explicit in Kant's general ethics in the spelling
out of the idea of the kingdom of ends in the Grundlegung. The first
formulation CI is a principle of justice or fairness, and by invoking the
idea of equality in settling on the proper amount of punishment we are
seeking through the punishment to restore the preexisting equality of
consideration. 12
So, Kant's insistence on the lex talionis is inspired by his thought
that punishment itself ought to be an application of the CL We find a
standard for the appropriate quantity and quality of punishment only
in the basic idea of the CI itself, the idea that we are all moral equals. 13
Now let us look more closely at this derivation, in particular the idea
that the punishment is to be quantitatively and qualitatively a sort of
mirror image of the crime. One of the merits of this idea, as we've seen, is
that it makes manifest to the person punished the appropriateness of a
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certain quality and quantity of punishment. And yet the proposition that
the punishment should mirror the crime is something other than a mere
analysis of the concept of punishment. Alternative statements of moral
principle here, though perhaps all incorrect, seem conceivable: that the
punishment should double, or be half the quantity of the crime, or that
the punishment for any moderately serious crime should be death, or
that each criminal conviction must entail the confiscation of exactly half
of one's property. The possible principles here are endless, and this is a
clue that the lex talionis is synthetic rather than analytic. And yet there
seems to be something special and intuitively plausible about the lex
talionis, as opposed to any of the possible alternatives. In Kant's scheme
of philosophical possibilities, this might suggest that the lex talionis is
synthetic a priori. That in fact seems to be exactly what Kant believed.
He begins to develop this idea in a remarkable passage that
develops an analogy between the realm of external freedom, and the
mathematical/physical world:
The law of reciprocal coercion necessarily in accord with freedom for
everyone under the principle of universal freedom is, as it were, the
construction of that concept, that is, the presentation of it in pure
intuition a priori, by analogy with presenting the possibility of bodies
moving freely under the law of the equality of action and reaction. In
pure mathematics we cannot derive the properties of its objects
immediately from concepts but can discover them only by constructing concepts. Similarly, it is not so much the concept of Right as
rather a fully reciprocal and equal coercion brought under universal
law and consistent with it, that makes the presentation of that concept
possible. (MS, 6:233)

This analogy between the model of the physical world, which was at
the center of Kant's attention for so long in the earlier years of his
philosophical development, and the political model of the reciprocal
rights of persons thought of as externally related to one another in
space is important. The Newtonian law that is most closely connected
in this analogy with the idea of punishment is the law of the equality of
action and reaction, Newton's third law, a principle that Kant thought
of as a synthetic a priori principle. 14
Hence, in Kant's view, the principle of punishment is indeed
synthetic a priori, by analogy with the geometrical/physical construction of bodies in space, and hence is necessary and invariable, like
any categorical imperative. Just as Newton's laws allow for zero
tolerance in variation of effect, given the cause, so likewise appropriate
punishment must fit the crime exactly, according to the lex talionis. But
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whence in the physical model comes the practical ideal that the
punishment must be qualitatively identical to the crime? Kant does not
answer this, but I suggest that the analogy for quality is vector
direction of reaction. Given the status of Newton's third law, we can
understand why Kant sought no further derivation of the principle of
punishment, regarding it rather as a sort of practical axiom or basic law.
Kant in the Groundwork, as is well known, said that violations of
perfect duties are actions such that "their maxim cannot even be conceived
as a universal law of nature without contradiction" (G, 4:424). On the
other hand, the "general canon" for all duties, perfect and imperfect, is
that "we must be able to will that a maxim of our action should become a
universal law" (G, 4:424). Nevertheless, many violations of duties that
we wish to call perfect duties seem to involve the failure of the broader
criterion only. IS This seems to be the case with respect to Kant's clearest
example of the application of the principle of law, his claim that a
hereditary nobility is contrary to Recht (see M5, 6:329; compare "Theory
and Practice," 8:291-93, 297-98), for Kant's point is that a person
excluded from such an advantage could not vote for such an arrangement, that is, could not will such a law. This example is discussed further
below in the section entitled "Other Examples of Application."
Now we can see more clearly the sort of "derivation" claimed for
the principle of punishment. There is no contradiction in conception in
a system that would have the punishment double the crime, or in a
system that would punish the entire range of possible crimes with
equal severity, that is, with the same punishment. After all, the lex
talionis is synthetic a priori, and therefore its denial is not self-contradictory. Nevertheless the lex talionis is the only true application
principle here, in Kant's view. Analogously, nature might, without
contradiction, be such that for every action the reaction doubles it/ 6 or
it might be such that the interior angles of a triangle are greater than
180 degrees. However, the true synthetic a priori proposition in each
case is different, stating what we know as Newton's third law and the
familiar theorem of Euclid.
So, although there is no incoherency or contradiction in having the
punishment double the crime, or halve the crime, such alternative
principles could not be willed by everyone. The subject being punished
could not rationally will excessive punishment, and those benefiting
from deterrence or those who are crime victims or friends of crime
victims could not rationally will punishment that was too light. The lex
talionis, proposing as it does equality of crime and punishment, is
simply an extension or instantiation of the universal principle of law,
which itself is already a principle of equality or fairness. With punishment, the key moral concept of equality (of initial distribution, or of
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regard before the law) is simply extended to state a principle for
responding to publicly wrongful actions.

Kant's Partial Retributivism
Kant is a partial retributivist only, because the function of the
institution of punishment is to provide deterrence of antisocial acts. 17
Punishment hence has a teleological function, a goal: Punishment
serves the function of protecting the rights of all of us, by providing
crime control through deterrence. The nonteleological side of punishment pertains to determining the proper quantity and quality of
punishment, determining the proper distribution of punishment for
those who have violated the law. This is not determined teleologically,
but formally, by the principle of equality, as embodied in the jus talionis.
This means that we may not adjust the amount of punishment to
enhance deterrence, or to achieve the most efficient balance between
enforcement costs and the costs of crime. IS
The actual examples of the lex talionis that Kant provides sound to
us quite harsh. Probably for that reason there was little problem within
the punishment theory as Kant thought of it, of having the lex talionis
indicating punishments that would be inadequate in their deterrent
effect. More often there would be "overkill," if I may use that expression, from the point of view of deterrence; that is, the punishment
would be more harsh than the needs of adequate deterrence would
require. We need to consider these questions of the adequacy of the
"match" between deterrence needs and the punishment dealt out by
the lex talionis, because the criteria for each are entirely independent of
each other in a partial retributivist theory like that of Kant, and it
appears that they could relate to each other in ways that would cause
trouble. The most likely sort of trouble I think will seldom occur,
namely, that the lex talionis mandates a punishment that is inadequate
for the purposes of deterrence. 19

The Right to Punish
What is Kant's chief concern in presenting a criterion to determine
the appropriate level of punishment? His concern, expressed over and
over again, is that the punishment be appropriate from the point of
view of the person who is receiving the punishment. Sometimes this
concern is expressed in the claim that the punishee could not
reasonably dispute the justice of the punishment. The phrase "the right
to punish" (from MS, 6:363), as Kant uses it, also suggests concern with
the punishee, for he is the individual against whom this right would be
exercised. After mentioning the right to punish, Kant concludes:
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To inflict whatever punishments one chooses for these crimes would be
literally contrary to the concept of punitive justice. For the only time
the criminal cannot complain that a wrong is done to him is when he
brings his evil deed back upon himself, and what is done to him in
accordance with penal law is what he has perpetrated on others, if not
in terms of its letter at least in terms of its spirit. (MS, 6:363)

Hence, the lex talionis alone assures that the rights of the punishee are
not violated. Again, Kant writes,
Moreover, one has never heard of anyone who was sentenced to death
for murder complaining that he was dealt with too severely and
therefore wronged: everyone would laugh in his face if he said this.
(MS, 6:334)20

In addition, there is another important qualification on the imposition of punishment, which also comes from concern for the personhood
of the punishee. When such a person is executed, the punishment
"must still be freed from any mistreatment that could make the
humanity in the person suffering it abominable" (MS, 6:333). In this
brief statement Kant opposes torture executions.
Since punishment, as our title quotation has indicated, is a
categorical imperative, it should not be surprising to find it so bound
up in Kant's thinking with the idea of respect for persons. Punishment
must respect the rights of the punishee. Any theory of the justification
of punishment, as a part of moral theory, must have an important
concern about the harm inflicted on the punishee.

Too Much/Too Little
It is easy enough to understand that punishment must not exceed
the limits of what is appropriate, and that, when it does so, it would be
a violation of the moral rights of the punishee. But it is more difficult to
understand why punishment short of the maximum may not be
permitted. Just how and why would it be a violation of anyone's rights
for a convicted murderer to be sentenced to a long prison sentence? Yet
Kant strongly speaks out against lesser sentences, and in one of his
most infamous statements, urges that death penalties against convicted
murderers should be carried out even when it could serve no purpose:
Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all its
members (e.g., if a people inhabiting an island decided to separate
and disperse throughout the world), the last murderer remaining in
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prison would first have to be executed, so that each has done to him
what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not cling to the people
for not having insisted on his punishment; for otherwise the people
can be regarded as collaborators in this public violation of justice.
(MS, 6:333/1

This sort of passage strongly suggests that Kant is a thorough retributivist, rather than a partial one, as was claimed above, for in the
circumstances described, the deterrent function of punishment would
seem to be nonexistent. It appears that the only reason for executing the
murderers is to let justice be done (= a retributivist rationale), since
there would be no continuing society that would experience the
benefits of deterrence that would in other circumstances flow from
such executions.
Kant himself never addresses this point, so what I suggest here is a
speculative extension of what I take to be Kant's basic ideas. There are
two points of justification Kant may have in mind here:
1.

2.

The crime is murder, and the scales of justice are not restored
until there is an execution. Not executing might seem to make
the murder victim something less than an equal of the
murderer, since the victim is dead and the murderer is allowed
to live. In other cases, when a serious crime is punished lightly,
the crime victims feel badly treated, and discriminated against.
Anything less than full retaliation, it might be said, denies
justice and equality to the victim.
Joel Feinberg quoted some of these extreme statements from
Kant in his "The Expressive Function of Punishment,"22 saying
that such passages marked Kant as an expression theorist. The
expressive function is no part of Kant's official theory, but if he
did hold to it and it explains such statements, then he would be
saying these things because he felt it was important to
denounce, through the act of punishment, the injustice of the
crime, and to reassert the innocence of the victim. However, the
expressive function mostly reduces to a deterrence aspect,
which is irrelevant in determining appropriate quantity and
quality of punishment.

It is true that Kant thinks of the lex talionis as being an exact, precise
standard that ideally at least allows zero tolerance. Punishment
according to the proper standard of the CI should be neither too little
nor too much. Such comments by Kant also may point toward the idea
that the failure to carry out appropriate punishment is a violation of a
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duty to oneself, which would reflect a lack of inner integrity or selfrespect. To fail to punish to the proper degree is to fail to have an
adequate hatred of criminal conduct; such an idea, which seems
implicit in Kant, brings him close to being an exponent of the expression theory.
Notice that the application of the CI to derive a standard of
punishment is different from the familiar four examples in the G/ and
other similar examples elsewhere in Kant's moral philosophy. It is
different because it does not have the agent deliberating about the
moral acceptability of her or his own maxim. Rather, the CI is used, not
in a context of personal choice and deliberation, but in order to make
an abstract moral judgment about the appropriate level (and, in Kant's
view, quality) of punishment. Such a judgment would be relevant to
the actions of and hence of interest to the sentencing judge, the
legislator, the punishee, the crime victim, or the mere interested moral
observer, in relation to their different roles.
In review, Kant's retributivism does not at all present the common
idea that retribution is a basic, axiomatic, underivable moral intuition
or emotion. The lex talionis is instead derived from the categorical
imperative itself, and for this reason includes as central to it the CI idea
of respect for persons, including the person to be punished. This is an
abstract derivation of a moral precept, characteristic of the Rechtslehre,
rather than a personal deliberation about one/s own maxim, and hence
about one/s own course of action that is characteristic of Kant/s ethics.
Also, Kant is not a pure retributivist; the state institutions of punishment are to serve the indispensable function of crime control. In all of
these ways Kant, unlike many more recent writers, "rationalizes" his
retributive theory of punishment. The famous outbursts, especially
about the need to execute all the condemned murderers before a society
disbands, cannot be entirely understood within the scope of Kant's
"rationalized retributivism/" but I hope that understanding how Kant
tries to justify his version of retributivism can help to make them seem
less outrageous. Kant thinks that punishment cannot be less than the
lex talionis requires, perhaps because such a punishment would reflect a
lack of equal respect for the crime victim, and also a lack of adequate
hatred of the wrongdoing being punished. 23

RELATED MATTERS

Now that we have presented the outline of Kant's views on
punishment, emphasizing how they are derived from the categorical
imperative, we will pursue some related topics.
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Punishments Incompatible with Humanity
As mentioned above, Kant rejected torture executions, saying that
capital punishment "must still be freed from any mistreatment that
could make the humanity in the person suffering it into something
abominable" (MS, 6:333). This thought, that exotic torturous forms of
execution such as drawing and quartering should not be permitted, is at
least one of the thoughts that moved the writers of the u.s. Bill of Rights
to forbid "cruel and unusual punishments" in its Eighth Amendment.
In the early 1970s the question of whether capital punishment in
and of itself may be contrary to the U.s. Constitution because it
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment was the question before the
U.S. Supreme Court, and in Furman v. Georgia (408 U.S. 238 [1972]) the
Supreme Court did reject capital punishment as it then existed as
unconstitutional. The five justices who formed the majority in Furman
were divided, however. Two, Brennan and Marshall, thought that in
principle capital punishment was unconstitutional. Three other justices
were only addressing capital punishment laws as they then existed,
and some of them were later convinced to join the majority in 1976 in
Gregg v. Georgia (428 U.S. 153 [1976]), in upholding a new form of law
that tried to guide the discretion of the sentencing authority Gudge or
jury) by listing mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the light of
which that sentencing authority would decide between death or a
lesser penalty. Our present interest, however, is in Brennan's more
absolutist opposition to the death penalty as found in his Furman
opinion. I quote at length:
Death is truly an awesome punishment. The calculated killing of a
human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the
executed person's humanity. The contrast with the plight of a person
punished by imprisonment is evident. An individual in prison does
not lose "the right to have rights."... A prisoner remains a member of
the human family.... An executed person has indeed "lost the right to
have rights." As one 19th century proponent of punishing criminals
by death declared, "When a man is hung, there is an end of our
relations with him. His execution is a way of saying, 'You are not fit
for this world, take your chance elsewhere.'''
In comparison with all other punishments today, then, the
deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely
degrading to human dignity.

The language of Kant and of Brennan is not precisely the same, but this
conclusion seems unavoidable: the reasons that Kant gives for rejecting
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torture executions (while defending capital punishment) are the same
as those Brennan gives for opposing capital punishment in every case.
Such treatment is incompatible with the humanity of the person being
punished. Brennan and Kant disagree only concerning the scope of the
state punishments that are forbidden. The only additional difference
(which here makes no difference) is that whereas Kant is expressing a
moral ideal, Brennan is writing as a Supreme Court justice with the
authority to interpret constitutional language, which is itself usually
understood as embodying certain moral ideals.
Now some may urge that the worst murderers have no humanity
to preserve. Kant would have disagreed with that, it seems, since he
never considered the possibility of beings with human shape but
without human potential. Jean Hampton briefly considers this
possibility in "The Moral Education Theory of Punishment," but does
not discuss it,24 Against this idea, it may be said that whenever we wish
to proceed to murder or genocide in some semipublic fashion, we do so
by dehumanizing those who are to die, as the Nazis did; so the
hypothesis, whether correct or incorrect, presents special dangers of
potential for misuse. Like Hampton, we will have to dismiss this
possibility without at present considering it further.
How are we to decide who is correct, Brennan or Kant? How broad
is the correct scope of the "inhumanity objection"? Does it cover only
torture executions or does it cover all executions? As thus stated, it
seems to me an unmanageable question that may not admit of a
generally convincing unique correct answer. In any case, answering this
question convincingly is also a project beyond the scope of this paper.
Suppose Brennan were right. Then Kant would have to make do
with some lesser punishment such as long-term imprisonment for such
"capital crimes" as murder or treason. Similar problems arise in
connection with punishments Kant proposes in a second-edition
appendix to the Rechtslehre. These additional examples are to make the
point that although one may not be able to find a qualitatively similar
punishment, one can find a punishment that brings back upon the
criminal his own conduct "if not in terms of its letter at least in terms of
its spirit" (MS, 6:363). Kant writes:
The punishment for rape and pederasty is castration (like that of a
white or black eunuch in a Seraglio), that for bestiality, permanent
expulsion from civil society, since the criminal has made himself
unworthy of human society. (MS, 6:363)

The U.s. Supreme Court has ruled out banishment as violative of the
"cruel and unusual punishment" clause (Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
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[1958]), and the mutilation of castration is one that many might wish to
reject on similar grounds. 25

Lex Talionis
A related problem, in spite of Kant's suggestions for punishments
"in the spirit" of the crime, is whether there are qualitatively appropriate
punishments for all crimes. Kant has an ingenious suggestion for the
appropriate punishment for theft:
But what does it mean to say, "If you steal from someone, you steal
from yourself"? Whoever steals makes the property of everyone else
insecure and therefore deprives himself (by the principle of
retribution) of security in any possible property. He has nothing and
can also acquire nothing; but he still wants to live, and this is now
possible only if others provide for him. But since the state will not
provide for him free of charge, he must let it have his powers for any
kind of work it pleases (in convict or prison labor) and is reduced to
the status of a slave for a certain time, or permanently if the state sees
fit. (MS, 6:333)

If we accept this account, then we have a large class of crimes taken

care of by something like imprisonment at hard labor: all property
crimes, including all theft, fraud, and burglary. The contemporary
American universal solution for criminal behavior of imposing long
prison sentences thus gains some endorsement from Kant with respect
to a large share of those now in prison.
But other crimes remain problematic. What about drug dealing?
First we must decide what the gravamen of this offense is, and that
would be no easy matter. What about tax evasion? Or perjury? The
problem of finding appropriate mirror-image punishments is more
acute in the case of crimes such as these, which may not have an
individual victim. What about assault? Do we assault the offender
back? What about escape from custody? The task of finding a punishment for each type of crime that is a quantitative and qualitative mirror
of the crime seems to be not possible of accomplishment, especially
when the demand for qualitative similarity is included. Even in the case
of theft, where Kant urges imprisonment at hard labor, we should ask,
"How long?" Will the answer depend on the amount stolen? Double
time for double money? The task of constructing perfectly equivalent
punishments for each crime seems beyond human capability. We could
surely accomplish such a task only by loosening the ties between crime
and punishment, along the lines proposed in Hyman Gross's schema
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for determining appropriate punishment, where the scale of crimes is
arranged and opposite it is a scale of punishments. 26 Crimes must be
arrangeable at least ordinally, something that is difficult enough. The
scale of punishments will have a certain pitch. But as Gross describes it,
there is no single "verifiable" point of contact between the two scales; if
there were, this would give us confidence about the correct match of
other point-pairs on the two scales. A defender of lex talionis like
Waldron does so without seeking for such a perfect, zero-tolerance
match between crime and appropriate punishment.
Kant discusses a large number of examples that in his view affect
appropriate punishment. He seems particularly interested in class
distinctions, which he thinks will make a difference in determining
appropriate punishment. These examples, which taken together are
somewhat puzzling and difficult to make sense of because of their
variety, are listed here to make it clear that Kant is sometimes less
doctrinaire with his examples than in his more abstract pronouncements. For example, after insisting fervently that death is the only
appropriate punishment for murder, he presents no fewer than three
examples that are in his view justified exceptions to this rule! ((4), (5),
and (6), below). In contrast (3) seems to be presented as a complicated
argument for the death penalty for treason. (1) Kant writes of a person
of high rank verbally insulting a person of lower rank. Punishment: the
offender must publicly apologize, and kiss the hand of the insulted one,
which will produce in him a humiliation similar to the one he produced
(MS, 6:332). (2) Again, he writes of a high-status person striking a lowstatus person. Punishment: The offender must apologize and also must
undergo solitary confinement involving hardship (MS, 6:332-33). (3) A
complicated case of men of honor and scoundrels being tried together
for treason (MS, 6:333-34). (4) Another complicated case where almost
everyone who was a citizen was an accomplice in the murder. Solution:
All should be sentenced to death, but then reprieved by executive
decree, and given a lesser punishment, perhaps banishment (MS,
6:334). The cases of (5) the mother murdering her illegitimate child (MS,
6:336) and of (6) killing a fellow soldier in a duel. In both cases the
killing has been motivated by a sense of honor, which would suggest a
lighter penalty. Kant's puzzling solution to both cases is that death
remains objectively the appropriate penalty, though it appears to be
unjust for reasons that are obscure to me (see MS, 6:336-37).
In conclusion, we can say that Kant's abstract theory of punishment sets a very high ideal: the punishment must be perfectly matched
to the crime, both quantitatively and qualitatively. There is a suggestion
that, ideally at least, there should be zero tolerance, in the sense that we
should be able to specify precisely what the appropriate punishment is.
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Only if there is zero tolerance will the punishment be defensible to the
person being punished, thereby making its appropriateness clear to her.

Punishment as Expressive and as Moral Education
This aspect of Kant's theory of punishment makes it seem similar
to two theories of punishment that have been more recently proposed:
the expressive theory of punishment (Feinberg) and the moral education theory (Hampton).27 All three views, in somewhat different ways
and for somewhat different reasons, emphasize the symbolic character
of punishment. The expressive theory, already mentioned above,
emphasizes the authoritative denunciation of the offender and his
action that is accomplished through the punishment. The moral
education theory emphasizes the aim of improving the moral character
of the person punished through the punishment's delivering a moral
message. In Kant's view the punishment is symbolic, but the primary
recipient of the message is the person punished, and the message is:
"This hard treatment is appropriate." Hampton is opposed to the death
penalty as incompatible with the goal of moral.education,28 and Kant
gives little hint that he wishes or expects to produce learning in the
person punished. If such an expectation were central to the institution
of punishment, rather than a happy by-product in some cases, then
Kant would have introduced teleological considerations into the heart
of his account of punishment. If the punishment is to have a general
deterrent effect, others must know of it, and probably must judge it
appropriate; to this extent Feinberg (and Scheid and Byrd) is correct in
judging Kant to be a deterrence theorist. But in Kant's own view
deterrence is a secondary (though still essential) effect, with the
primary concern being the appropriateness of the punishment in
relation to the punishee.

Other Examples ofApplications
Kant does not have very many examples of explicit application of
the categorical imperative in the context of Recht. Perhaps the theory of
property is another such application, at least at certain points. I will not
pursue this example now, since it would involve considerable
complexity. A more manageable example for our purposes is Kant's
argument against the privileges of a hereditary class of nobility. Like
Kant's theory of property, it also involves the key requirement of
potential universal advance consent.
Kant states the requirement of advance consent most fully in
"Theory and Practice" (1793, KGS 8:273-313), where he describes it as
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"a mere idea of reason, one, however, that has indubitable (practical)
reality" (KGS 8:297):
Specifically, it obligates every legislator to formulate his laws in such
a way that they could have sprung from the unified will of the entire
people and to regard every subject, insofar as he desires to be a
citizen, as if he had joined in voting for such a will. For that is the
criterion of every public law's conformity with right. If a public law is
so formulated that an entire people could not possibly agree to it (as,
e.g., that a particular class of subjects has the hereditary privilege of
being a ruling class), it is not just; however, if only it is possible that a
people could agree to it, it is a duty to regard that law as just, even if
the people are presently in such a position or disposition of mind that
if asked it would probably withhold its consent. (KGS 8:297; also see
8:289-300; and MS, 6:328-29)

This criterion is similar to what Kant in the Groundwork calls "the
general canon for all moral judgment of action" (G, 4:424), namely, that
"we must be able to will that our action should become a universal law"
(G, 4:424). It is not an instance of the more specific test used in
connection with the case of the lying promise, namely, that "Some
actions are so constituted that their maxim cannot even be conceived as a
universal law of nature without contradiction" (G, 4:424). One can
speculate that such Recht-applications present another partial picture of
the idea of the Kingdom of Ends that Kant presents in the Grundlegung,
though Kant never tells us so. Clearly, the requirement of general
will-like universal consent is an alternative statement of the "universal
law" conception that is found in many formulations of the categorical
imperative.
This general criterion, together with the sample application to
reject hereditary nobilities, represents another sample application of the
Kantian principle of law, together with another description of the
application process. The exercise takes place entirely in the realm of
ideas, and the results of any such exercise would be conclusions about
the normativity or lack thereof of actual positive laws and social
institutions.
Does this general criterion work for the case of Kant's theory of
punishment? Consider the following as a sketch for a Yes answer: Who
is the person whose reason is not likely to consent to punishment?
Answer: the one being punished. So, in justifying punishment we must
focus our attention on that one, and assure ourselves that we can justify
the punishment to him. So the general criterion explains Kant's approach
to the justification of punishmenU9
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Probably the main difference between such examples and the more
familiar four examples in the Grundlegung is that the latter ethical
applications deal with the agent's maxims, and hence have a background assumption about the agent's motivation that is absent in the
applications of Recht. Moral principles of Recht are always mere
impersonal precepts, with the motivation left unspecified, and also the
direction to specific agents left unspecified. Maxims, reflecting as they
do the agent's personal choices of actions, ends of action, and motives
of action are absolutely central to the realm of inner freedom that Kant
calls "ethics."30 But judgments concerning Recht involve no such
reference to the agent's personal choices or motives. 31

Conclusion
The main aim of this paper has been to examine Kant's views on
punishment in relation to the most central ideas of his moral philosophy, especially respect for persons, but also the ideas of the
categorical imperative, and of justice and equality. Kant's views on
punishment are not isolated and separable from his other ideas on
ethics and politics. Arguably, this should make his views on punishment seem more interesting than they otherwise might seem, for they
are shaped by the most powerful and attractive ideas that make his
ethical theory as a whole a matter of so much philosophical interest.
The harsh retributivism that lies on the surface of these texts is
tempered by deeper-lying teleological themes: the benefits of deterrence of antisocial actions in preserving our rights, and the moral
teleology of the idea of respect for persons. This discussion, also
enriched with a brief consideration of Kant's argument against
hereditary nobility, broadens our understanding of how the categorical
imperative is to be applied outside of ethics, in the area of Recht.

NOTES

1. MS, 6:331. MS stands for Metaphysik der Sitten by Kant (1797-98). G
stands for Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785). Later references to
Kant's writings are given in the text; after an abbreviation for the work, these
references contain volume and page of the passage in in Prussian Academy
edition of Kant's works: Kants gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der
Deutschen (fomerly Koniglichen Preufiischen) Akademie der Wissenschafter, 29
volumes (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter [and predecessors], 1902), hereafter KGS.
Most English translations of works referred to include these page numbers
marginally. For translations from MS I use Mary Gregor's translation.
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2. For example see Michael S. Moore, "The Moral Worth of Retribution,"
in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, ed. Ferdinand Schoeman
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Moore even makes use of that
popular master of inflammatory rhetoric Mike Royko to make the ressentiment
family of feelings seem to be morally attractive. It has sometimes even been
urged that there may be an evolutionary basis for retribution, because a
strategy of being initially open to cooperation with new persons, and then
responding in a friendly fashion to friendly responses, and in unfriendly
fashion to unfriendly responses (and it is here that we have the retribution-like
response) may have by this time in our species-history as social animals been
hardwired into us. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York:
Basic Books, 1984).
3. For more on this see Michael Davis's Make the Punishment Fit the Crime
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), chapter 2, "The Relative Independence
of Punishment Theory."
4. What is directly established by the procedure of applying the
categorical imperative is the acceptability or not of the maxim of action that is
being tested. But if a lying promise maxim is shown to be unacceptable in a CI
test then there is or seems to be a rather direct inference to the following being a
categorical imperative: "Do not make lying promises."
5. See Exodus 21:23-25, where the full quote is: "And if any mischief
follow, then thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for
hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe."
Cf. Numbers 35:21; Leviticus 24:17-20. For an excellent recent discussion of this
idea, see Jeremy Waldron, "Lex Talionis," Arizona Law Review 34 (1992): 25-51.

6. This is admittedly an optimistic view of the state, or perhaps better an
idealized view of the state. But Kant's view on this obligation to leave the state
of nature, and on his absolute prohibition of revolution no matter how unjust
the state, seems to be that any state at all is better than the state of nature.
7. For example, Kant was a republican, and an opponent of heriditary
nobility. He lived in an authoritarian state that was something quite different
from a republic, and was surrounded by political societies that had hereditary
nobilities; in fact, further, he was as a university professor an employee of the
state, and he made his peace with it, and expressed in his writings his
commitment to obey its commands. For a discussion of the appropriate
respective realms of obedience and scholarly freedom see the essay "What Is
Enlightenment?" and also "Strife of the Faculties," both KGS 9.
8. Kant makes this point when, after offering a republican definition of
the state, which, so far as it is in accord with the pure principles of Right, forms
an Idea of the state: "This Idea serves as a norm (norma) for every actual union
into a commonwealth (hence serves as a norm for its internal constitution) (MS,
6:313). As such it provides us with a standard for use in criticizing existing
institutions and practices. We must strive after realizing this ideal: "it is that
[ideal] condition which reason, by a categorical imperative [Kant's emphasis]
makes it obligatory for us to strive after" (MS, 6:318).
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9. For example, A:s hitting and injuring B interferes with B's freedom,
though it may be something that A wants to do. A:s taking B's food and eating
it himself again interferes with B's intended use. A complete discussion of the
retributive idea would also include crimes that may not have specific victims,
such as tax evasion or perjury. Although there is a mention of a "maxim"
above, as in the earlier statements of the CI in the Grundlegung, and maxims are
inner entities that state people's intentions and motives, the only concern of this
principle of the Rechtslehre is with external action.

10. Advance prevention is of limited usefulness; burglars and rapists, for
example, usually take care to avoid the presence of others who might interfere.
Kant gives us a Newtonian analogy for the importance of the concept of
equality:
The law of a reciprocal coercion necessarily in accord with the
freedom of everyone under the principle of universal freedom, is, as it
were, the construction of that concept, that is, the presentation of it in
pure intuition a priori by analogy with presenting the possibility of
bodies moving freely under the law of the equality ofaction and reaction.
(MS, 6:232)
The phrase "a fully recipricol and equal coercion" (MS, 6:232) that Kant uses in
explicating this idea surely means not that everyone is coerced equally, but
more like this: that everyone is subject to coercion to an equal extent, whenever
he or she has performed the same sort of punishable act.
11. If wealthy A offers starving B money for food, he affects him, and his
failure to offer help affects him negatively. But B has no right to A:s assistance,
and hence A:s obligations in such cases are discussed not in the Rechtslehre
portion of the Metaphysik der Sitten but in the Tugendlehre portion.
12. Equality of consideration may be illustrated as follows: A murders B,
and is subsequently punished by being executed. The status quo ante was that
A and B were equal in being alive; the status quo post is that they are equal in
both being dead. The original equality is impossible to restore, since that could
happen only by bringing the dead (A) back to life. But the formal equality that
existed before also exists again after the punishment, and so there is a sort of
restoration of equality.
13. Notice that Kant's scales of justice comparison is merely quantitative;
Kant indicates he also wishes the punishment to be qualitatively identical as
well, and in fact he defends capital punishment for murder by saying that
"There is no similarity between life, however wretched it may be, and death,
hence no likeness between the crime and the retribution, unless death is
judicially carried out upon the wrongdoer" (MS, 6:333). I believe that Kant will
have difficulty defending his insistence that the punishment be similar in
quality as well as in quantity, but defense of this thesis will have to await
another paper.
14. See Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1992),44.

188

KANT

d

CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL ISSUES / POTTER

15. This surprising result is perhaps clearest in Barbara Herman's essay,
"Murder and Mayhem," reprinted as chapter 6 of The Practice of Moral
Judgment, ed. Barbara Herman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1993).
16. I say this although any departure from the equality of action and
reaction is a violation of conservation principles that are very basic to physics.
If the reaction doubled the action, for example, then we would have a creation
of new energy out of nothing, and the possibility of a perpetual motion
machine, for instance.
17. For development of this interpretation see Don Scheid, "Kant's Retributivism," Ethics 93 (1983): 262-82; Sharon Byrd, "Kant's Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat, Retribution in Its Execution," Law and Philosophy
1 (1989): 151-200; and the author's own "Kant on Obligation and Motivation in
Law and Ethics," Jahrbuch flir Recht und Ethik 2 (1994): 95-112.
18. For example, some law that is difficult to enforce, such as vandalism,
we might enforce by punishing the few we catch with excessive severity; this
might be less costly than beefing up enforcement, and catching more people in
the act, which might have a deterrence-enhancing effect equal to the other
policy, while being more expensive. The now familiar utilitarian idea of
maximizing efficiency of deterrence is an idea that comes into common currency
only in the nineteenth century, so in Kant we have the idea of deterrence, but
no idea of maximizing deterrence. In any case, such a maximizing idea is quite
at odds with Kant's approach in this area.
19. Where the mandated punishment is inadequate, we might call the
principle the lax talionis. What should count as "adequate" deterrence is a nice
question. It cannot mean a punishment adequate to deter any would-be
criminal, for this would mean no punishment would be adequate. How can
any punishment be adequate to deter a would-be malefactor who believes, no
matter how irrationally, that he will not get caught, or who is not at all thinking
about possible consequences of his punishable act? Such actions seem to be
"undeterrable." Very roughly, a punishment will be "adequate" in deterrent
effect if it would deter most deterrable criminal acts of a given kind.
20. Even in the second Critique, where Kant only briefly introduces the
subject of punishment for a paragraph, he mentions the concern about the right
of the punishee:

For even though he who punishes can do so with the benevolent
intention of directing his punishment to [the ultimate happiness of the
one being punished], it must nevertheless be justified as punishment,
i.e., as mere harm in itself, so that even the punished person, if it
stopped there and he could see no glimpse of kindness behind the
harshness, would yet have to admit that justice had been done and
that his reward perfectly fitted his behavior. (KpY, 5:37)
21. Maybe Kant got carried away here. He sometimes gets carried away
when he is writing against an opponent. (Cf. the response to Benjamin
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Constant in "On a Supposed Right to Lie ...") His juices have been brought to
a boil by Marchese Beccaria (referred to at end of MS, 6:334), who opposed
capital punishment, and he is tempted into an overstatement in his reply. It is
tempting to say this, but this explains away rather than explaining the passage.
I think personally, however, that this remains a part of the correct explanation
of such extreme comments.
Kant makes a similar statement against lessening punishment earlier. It is
the rest of the sentence that our title-quotation comes from:
The principle of punishment is a categorical imperative and less woe
to him who crawls through the windings of eudaemonism in order to
discover something that releases the criminal from punishment or
even reduces its amount by the advantage it promises, in accordance
with the Pharisaical saying, "It is better for one man to die than for an
entire people to perish." (MS, 6:331-32)
So if such extreme remarks are a slip of the pen, or a temptation in the heat of a
response, they are repeated slips or temptations.
22. Reprinted in Feinberg's Doing and Deserving (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1970), 95-118. Insofar as Kant has in mind the physical
construction model of bodies in space in thinking of punishment, this model
limits comparison with conceptions of punishment as expressive. Deterrence in
the physical analogy would be like the natural consequences of an equal
reaction = punishment restoring the original equilibrium of a given body with
others, rather than the effects of authoritative denunciation and its
psychological (e.g., deterrent) effects on others.
23. I have hinted at the difficulties, in my view, of defending, or even of
working out and presenting, a version of the lex talionis that provides for both
quantative and qualitative likeness between crime and punishment. If the
requirement of qualitative likeness is dropped, arguably the lex talionis becomes
little more than the retributive idea that the punishment should fit (a
quantitative concept) the crime. I will discuss Kant's presentation of the lex
talionis, and the numerous examples he includes later in this chapter.
24. See her comment directly after her footnote 22. The killing of human
beings when it is done after the model of the destruction of excessive numbers
of dogs or cats, or badly injured horses, for example, would be something other
than punishment. Such actions would be clearly incompatible with any
positive claims concerning the humanity of the individual being thus killed.
25. Proposals for castration are often presented as an alternative to life in
prison to be undertaken only with the consent of convict. Even so, it raises
troubling issues. Another problem with the punishment for "bestiality" is that
it approximates to being a victimless crime that adversely affects the freedom
of no other person; it seems that it would at worst be a violation of a duty to
oneself, especially given Kant's views on the moral standing of animals.
26. See his "Culpability and Desert" from Archiv fir Rechts und Sozialphilosophie 19 (1983). This essay is reprinted in most editions of Philosophy of
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Law, 4th ed., ed. Joel Feinberg and Hyman Gross (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth,

1991),669-76, or example.
27. Feinberg, Doing and Deserving; Jean Hampton, "The Moral Education
Theory of Punishment," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13.3 (1984): 208-38.
Compare Herbert Morris,"A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment," American
Philosophical Quarterly 18.4 (October 1981). Insofar as Kant has in mind the
physical!geometrical model of objects in space in equilibrium in thinking of
punishment, the comparison of Kant's views with the moral education view
will be limited. According to the geometrical model individual agents are
thought of simply as Newtonian bodies; hence the idea of the "education" of
such bodies is quite foreign to the analogy.
28. See the discussion around footnote 22 of Hampton, "The Moral
Education Theory of Punishment."
29. Look at Kant's interesting discussion of issues related to this point at
MS, 6:335. There Kant is replying to Beccaria's criticism of the death penalty
that provision for such could never be contained in the original contract,
because individuals could never consent there to lose their own life in case they
murdered someone. Kant's reply is to make a distinction between the aspect of
the person that would so consent (homo noumenon) and the aspect that would
not (homo phenomenon): "The chief point of error (proton pseudos) in this
sophistry consists in its confusing the criminal's own judgment (which must
necessarily be ascribed to his reason) that he has to foreit his life with a resolve
on the part of his will to take his own life, and so in representing as united in
one and the same person the judgment upon a right [Rechtsbeurteilung] and the
realization of that right [Rechtsvollziehung]" (MS, 6:235). There is a further
discussion of issues concerning application and consent earlier in this paper.
30. See the author's "Maxims in Kant's Moral Philosophy," Philosophia 23.1
Ouly 1994): 59-90, for further discussion of these points.
31. Sidney Axinn gave me useful comments on an early draft of this essay.
A shorter version of it was presented to the Pacific Division of the American
Philosophical Association on March 31, 1995, with useful and provocative
comments by Jacqueline Marina and from the floor. Most important, very
helpful critical comments were given me on the penultimate draft of the paper
by Don Scheid, and all along the way I discussed the project with my colleague
Mark van Roojen.

